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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
J. WENDELL BAYLES, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 





STATEMENT OF THE XATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a proceeding to review a determination of 
the Utah Stat,e Tax Commission in which it was held 
that the amounts received by the plaintiff as a scholar-
ship and fellowship grants for the purpose of enabling 
him to continue his educational studies were subject to 
taxation under the applicable statutory provi,sions of the 
State of Utah, and particularly Repl. Yol. Utah Code 
Ann. §59-14-4 (1963). 
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DISPOSITION B:B~FORID THE UTAH STATE 
TAX COM.MISSION 
An informal hearing on this matter was held beforp 
the Utah State Tax Commis:-;ion on September 28, 1966. 
The conclusion was that the claim fo1· refund should be 
denied, and that the deficieucy determined by the audit. 
ing division should be snstaiiled. A formal hearing was 
waived by the parties uasccl on the stipulation of facts 
which has been filed with the Utah State Tax Commis· 
sion and which is a pai·t of the record before this court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The plaintiff seek·s to have the decision (R. 35-38) 
of the Utah 1State Tax Commission reversed and a judg-
ment entered exempting from income the amounts re· 
ceived by individuals for scholarship and fellowshir 
grants. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties to this action have entered into a stipu· 
lation of facts (R. 18-23), and these facts are incorpor· 
ated herein except to the extent it is necesary fo restatt 
them in .setting forth the position of the defendant. 
2 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
AMOUNTS RECEIVED BY PLAINTIFF AS 
SCHOLARSHIP OR FELLOWSHIP GRANTS TO 
ENABLE HIM TO PURSUE HIS EDUCATIONAL 
STUDIES MUST BE INCLUDED AS INCOME FOR 
THE PURPORE OF THE STATUTES OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH RE~LATING TO INDIVIDUAL 
INCOME TAXATION. 
The Utah State Tax Commission has for many years 
held that amounts received as scholarship or fellowship 
grants are taxable under the appfr·able statutes. Its re-
liance has been placed on Repl. Yol. Utah Code Ann. 
§59-14-4(1) (1963) which provides: 
Gross income includes gains, profits and in-
come derived from salaries, wages or compensa-
tion for personal senicc of w ha teYer kind and 
in whatever form paid, or from professions, voca-
tions, trade, businesses, commerce ,or ,sales or 
dealings in property, whether real or personal, 
growing out of the ownership or use of or interest 
in such property, also from interest, rent, royal-
ties, dividends, securities or the transaction of 
any business carried on for gain or profit, or 
gains or profits, periodic· payments received a,s 
alimony only, and income derived from any source 
whatever. 
As this court is well a ware, both this type of statute 
and the comparable federal statute dealing with income 
taxation has been interpreted as ineluding all sources of 
3 
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income, no matter how clerivecl. Comrnissioner v GI . {//. 
shaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 42G, 75 S. Ct. 473, 99 L.Ed. 4Ss 
(1954), Helvering v. Cliffc·rd, 309 U.S. 3331, 60 S. Ct. 
554, 84 L.Ed. 788 (1940); Jiclvcring v. Midland Mutual 
Life Ins. Co., 300 U.8. 21G, 37 S. Ct. 423, 81 L.Ed. 611 
(1937). 
Nevertheless, exceptions have been made for certain 
types of r·eceipts reC'eivcd a;,; income, specifically Rep!.. 
Vol. Utah Code Ann. § u9-14-4(2) (c) (19'63) exempb' 
amounts received as gifts: 
The following items shall not be included in 
gross income and shall be exempt from taxation · 
under this chapter: ... 
The value of property acquired by gift, be·! 
quest, devise or inheritance (but the income from: 
such property shall be included in gross income). 1 
It would appear, tlie11, that this court must deter·: 
mine whether the amounts received by the plaintiff are 
exempt fr.om the income tax provision under this subsec· 1 
tion since the law is certainly broad enough to have these' 
included under its general provision. 
There appear to be no C'ases from this court in whici1 ' 
it h&s been determined whether these types of payment'; 
are to be included in income. As the plaintiff has noted, 
in the past the Utah statutory provisions closely para!· 
leled the federal statutes, and some consideration can be 
given the decisional and statutory developments there. i 
It ·should be noted at the outset that prior to 195J . 
there were no federal statutes dealing specifically with 
4 
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the treatment that ·should be accorded scholarship and 
fellowship grants. Prior to that time there had been con-
fusion as to how these awards shoud be treated. Because 
of this confusion, in 1954 when Congress rewrote the 
Internal Revenue Code it was determined that there 
should be included a provision defining what types of 
fellowship and scholarship payments should or should 
not be included in the income of the recipients for the 
purpose of federal income taxation. 
Prior to that time the federal law read much as does 
our law and was generally interpreted by the Bureau of 
Internal Revenue (now Internal Revenue Service) to 
require the inclusion of such amounts in the income re-
ported to the government by the recipients. The basic 
premise of the defendant is that where a statute requires 
the inclusion of certain amounts in income, there shall 
be no exclusion unless specifically provided for. The de-
dendant further contends that the provisions of the Utah 
Code relating to the exemption of gifts from income in 
Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann.§ 59-14-4(2) (c) (1963) does 
not encompass the awards received by the plaintiff from 
the University of Utah and the New York University. 
It would appear to the defendant that the statutes 
of this state relating to income are broad enough to cover 
the amounts received as fellowship or scholarship grants 
and that it must be determined only whether they consti-
tute a gift under our applicable provisions. It might be 
noted here parenthetically that the amounts such as those 
received by the plaintiff while attending the New York 
5 
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University were excludable from income in that jurisdic. 
tion only by virtue of a statute enacted by that state in 
1958 closely paralleling the federal statutory provisions 
and exempting from gT·oss income amounts received as 
scholarship or fellowship grants. New York Tax Lair 
I 
§ 359(2) (r). \Vhile several legislatures of the various 
states have seen fit to enact this or similar types of statu. 
tory provisions, this court should keep in mind that the 
Utah State Legislature either has not found it necessary 
or desirable to amend its statutory provisions. This, even 
though the Utah State Tax Commission has consistently 
held that such amounts must be reported and included as 
income. The Legislature presumably is and has been 
aware of this administration interpretation and practice. 
In attempting to determine whether amounts re-
ceived as scholarship and fellowship grants can be. 
tr·eated as a gift, it ·should be made plain that the common. 
law concept of gifts is not the keystone when we are ; 
attempting to determine whether certain receipts should 
1 
be taxed. The defendant feels that in attempting to re· 
solve whether or not these amounts may be excluded 
under the gift provision of our income tax statute, it 
must examine the latest and most discursive pronounce· : 
ment of the United States Supreme Court. This is the 
case of Commissioner v. Dnberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 8~ 
S.Ct. 1190, 4 L.Ed.2d 1218 (1960) where the court made 
several pertinent observations which we feel this court ! 
should take notice of. First, in determining the meaning 1 
of gift within the context of the statute, the court made 
this observation: 
6 
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The course of decision here makes it plain that 
the statute [federal internal revenue income tax 
provision] does not use the term "gift'' in the 
common-law sense, but in a more colloquial sense. 
This court has indicated that a voluntary execu-
ted transfer of this property by one to another, 
without any consideration of compensation there-
for, though a common-law gift, it not necessarily 
a ''gift'' within the meaning of the statute. For 
the court has shown that the mere absence of a 
legal or moral ·Obligation to make such a payment 
does not establish that it is a gift. 363 U.S. at 285, 
80 8.Ct. at 1196, 4 L.Ed.2d at 1224. 
The court further went on to state that: 
And, importantly, if the payment proceeds 
primarily from ''the constraining force of any 
moral or legal duty," or from "the incentive of 
anticipated benefit" of an economic nature ( cita-
tions) it is not a gift. And, conversely, "where 
the payment is in return for services rendered, it 
is irrelevant that the donor recognize no benefit 
from it." 363 U.S. at 285, 80 S.Ct. at 1196, 4 
L.Ed.2d at 1225. 
Then, the court indicated what it would feel would 
be a gift under the revenue statutes. It said that: 
A gift in the statutory sense, on the other hand, 
proceeds from a "detached and disinterested gen-
erosity," ... ''out of affection, respect, admira-
tion, charity or like impulses.'' 363 U.1S. at 2885, 
80 S.Ct. at 1197, 4 L.Ed.2d at 1225. 
It is the position of the defendant that this case is 
controlling when determining whether scholarship or 
fello~ship grants should be excluded under the Utah law. 
7 
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We think, too, that the deeisio11 of the United States 
Supreme Court in the case of Robertson v. United States : 
343 U.S. 711, 72 S.Ct. 994, 9G L.Ed. 1237 (1951) which wa; 
cited favorably and frequently in Diibcrstein and which 
also involved a prominent resident of the State of Utah . 
I 
establishes the propositirm that where an individual per-
forms an act or :-igrees to perform an act or service, the 
amounts he re0eives are properly included in income since 
this is a type of consideration which extends beyond the 
boundaries of a gift within the meaning of the revenue 
statutes. 
In Robertson the taxpayer composed a musical com-
position in the late 1930s apparently under no grant and 
not for the fulfillment of any educational requirement. 
Some six years later, the composition was submitted to 
judges of a musical contest established by a philant.hro-
pist and taxpayer won the award that had been provided. 
The court held that, contrary to the taxpayer's conten· 
tion that the award should be excluded as a gift, the I 
award was properly includable in income. The mere sub-
mi,ssion of the composition established as income the 
amount received. Here the plaintiff received amounts 
through an accredited institution which he attended and 1 
at which he pursued a course of study leading to an 
academic degree - all of which were contemplated in 
making the grant available to him. His involvement, 
active participation and agreement to perform certain . 
acts were much greater than those in Robertson and the 1 
amounts received should be treated as income for Utah 
state income tax purposes. 
8 
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The defendant feels that the court should take notice 
of the one case relied upon by the plaintiff - George 
Winchester &tune, Jr., 23 T.C. 254 (1954) - which per-
mitted the taxpayer to exclude from income certain 
amounts whid1 he had received from a foundation. There 
are a number of factors which would distinguish this case 
from the situation which the court is now being asked to 
consider. In Stone the taxpayer was not a student at-
tending any accredited school; he was not entitled to any 
curriculum credits; he was n{)t working toward nor did 
he receive an academic degree; and the award was not 
given to him under any circumstances paralleling those 
of an academic institution. In the instant situation, of 
course, the taxpayer was attending an accredited and 
recognized educational institution; the grants wern given 
to him to enable him to pursue his studies; he was ex-
pected, though not legally required, to pursue his educa-
tional training during the periods of the grants, and had 
he not done so it is doubtful the institution would have 
r:ontinued to make the amounts available to him; the 
grants would not have been made had it not been thought 
the taxpayer would pursue his a vowed course of study; 
and, all ·Of the grants were made with the anticipation 
that the taxpayer would obtain an accredited educational 
degree which, in fact, he did in receiving an LL.B. degree 
from the University of Utah and an LL.M. degree from 
the New York University. 
It appears to the def end ant that the taxpayer comes 
well within the guidelines set forth in Robertso1i and 
Duberstein establishing the ineide11ee of taxation. While 
9 
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the individuals who estabfo;h within the administrative 
framework of these uni\'er:oities a fund to be u8ed for 
the purpose of providing seholarship and fellowship 
grants to deserving students may often have no know]. 
edge ·Of the recipients, it IYas certainly the intent of these 
individuals to have their funds made available to desen-
ing ,students and to individuals \vho were progressing 
towards an academic degree. "\Yhen these students ap-
plied for, were awarded, ancl dicl accept the grants which 
had been made available to them, the defendant feels 
that they came ·within the guidelines established by 
Robertson, and that this was the type of service or per· 
formance considered by the court in Duberstein which 
would hold that the amounts received were taxable even 
though the donor derived no economic benefit from such 
service or performance. That the donor receives nD 
economic benefit from the recipient of a ·scholarship Gr 
fellowship grant does not convert such a receipt into a 
gift within the meaning of the statutes in the bands of 
the recipient. Commissioner Y. Duberstein, supra; Rov 
ertson v. United States, supra. I I 
• , I 
There is attendant upon all funds established by m; 
dividuals a desire it would :,;cem, to train persons whui 
' I 
will be of a benefit to the community, to add to the preq 
tige of educational institutions, and to attract tbroughl 
the use of their funds individuals who not only need !hr: 
source of income during this period of training, but wh(l 1 
will also be a credit to the institution itself. Thi~, '.oo, ir l 
is felt indicates that such awards are uot gifts w1tbrn the I 
meaning of the statute, but are amounts which must Lt i 
10 
I 
~ Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
included in income uncler the Yery broad provision es-
tablished by the Legislature. 
POINT II 
WHETHER PLAINTIFF l\IAY DEDUCT FROM 
HIS REPORTED INCOME AMOUNTS INCURRED 
AS EDUCATIONAL EXPENSES WHILE ATTEND-
ING THE NE\V YORK UNIVERSITY. 
Regulation 14-5, para. 19 of the Utah Income Tax 
Act provides : 
Expenditures made by a taxpayer for his edu-
cation are deductible if sueh education is under-
taken primarily for the purpose of maintaining or 
improving skills required by the taxpayer in his 
employment or other trade or business or meeting 
the express requirements of a taxpayer's em-
ployer, or the requirements of applicable law or 
regulations, imposed as a condition to the reten-
tion by the taxpayer of his salary, status or em-
ployment. Educational expenses are not deducti-
ble if the primary purpo·se for 1chich they are 
incurred is to obtain a ncu' position, or a substan-
tial advancement in a present position or to fulfill 
the general educational aspirations of the tax-
payer. Likewise sitch expenses are not deductible 
if the edu.cation is 11eerled to meet the minimum 
requirements to qualify for, or become established 
in a positio·n, business or specialty. (Emphasis 
added.) 
The taxpayer has made the further argument that 
' the expenses he incurred while attending New York Uni-
11 
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versity were deductible stlll") lie ,,.a, o 1 · t · - "' s 11 Y mam ami111r 
and improviug skills he lrn(l already obtained and, fu; 
ther, that he was incuniug >0nch expenses at the request 
of bis employer. The <lefernlm1t feels it is not necessan 
to deal at length with this i,,,::me as raised by the taxpaye; 
It should be acknowledgetl ouly that the taxpayer pur. 
sued a course of stndy w hie h enabled him to obtain an 
advance <legr,'e in a specialized field of law, namely tax 
ation. While an individual may be improving upon the 
knowledge he obtained in his formal education, it is dif!i. 
cult to imagine that any practitioner iu the field of law 
having obtained his degree from a recognized and even 
a most prestigious institution would contend that he is so 
well qualified within a specialty that further education or 
training is not either necessary or desirable if he can 
possibly obtain it. The defendant contends that a law 
school graduate who pursues his studies with the inten 
tion of attaining a master of laws degree, and particu· 
larly one who pursues such studies immediately after 
obtaining his initial law degree, at ·Such institutions a: 
well recognized as the New York University, are not on!: 
maintaining or improving such basic skills as they ma) 
have, but are in the course of aequiring the education 
necessary to engage in the specialized field of law to 
which they aspire. Further, we think rather specious !ht 
contention that the taxpayer's employer reqitired (tbt 
term used in the regulation) him to attend the New Yorli 
University and attain a master of laws degree with a 
concentration in the field of taxation. Even assuminf 
that the law firm, which this taxpayer had \rorked foras 
12 
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a clerk, thought it desirable to have an individual who 
was highly trained in the field of taxation, it is question-
able, recognizing the fluidity of law associations, the 
relative instability of the association of new law school 
graduates with major firms, and the aYailability of law-
yers with the requisite educational and governmental 
training that any firm could be said to require an incom-
ing associate to attend an educational study which may 
take an additional one to two years. It is the contention 
of the defendant, therefore, that perhaps while the law 
firm with which the taxpayer was associated would have 
encouraged and would have desired him to have this 
additional training, this was not a requirement for his 
association with the firm, and that his attendance at the 
New York University was for the ultimate goal of attain-
ing an LL.M. degree. Such attendance was not primarily 
for the purpose of maintaining and improving skills al-
ready acquired, or meeting the express requirements of 
his employer, but were for the purpose of obtaining and 
developing his skills in the field of taxation. 
CONCLUSION 
1 
In conclusion, then, the defendant contends that the 
'\ type of scholarship and fellowship grants received by 
the plaintiff at both the University of Utah and at New 
York University were income within the meaning of the 
statute; that such amounts were not excludable from in-
come as a gift; and, that the amounts received were not 
deductible as educational expenses within the meaning 
13 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of the statute; that such amounts were not excludable 
from income as a gift; anJ, that the amounts receivea 
were not deductible as educational expenses within the 
meaning of the applicable regulatory provision. There-
fore, the decision of the Utah State Tax Commission 
,should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
HENRY L. ADAMS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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